Academic skepticism

Academic skepticism refers to the skeptical period of ancient Platonism dating from around 266 BC, when Arcesilaus became head of the Platonic Academy, until around 90 BC, when Antiochus of Ascalon rejected skepticism. Unlike the existing school of skepticism, the Pyrrhonists, they maintained that knowledge of things is impossible. Ideas or notions are never true; nevertheless, there are degrees of probability, and hence degrees of belief, which allow one to act. The school was characterized by its attacks on the Stoics and on their belief in convincing impressions which lead to true knowledge. The most important Academic skeptics were Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo of Larissa.

Greek skepticism, as a distinct school, began with Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360 BC-c. 270 BC), about whom very little is known. His followers, the Pyrrhonists, maintained that our theories and our sense impressions were unable to accurately distinguish truth from falsehood; therefore we must assume an attitude of reserve (epoche). They were consistent enough to extend their doubt even to their own principle of doubt. They thus attempted to make their skepticism universal, and to escape the reproach of basing it upon a fresh dogmatism. Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the result to be attained by cultivating such a frame of mind.

Around 266 BC, Arcesilaus became head of the Platonic Academy, and adopted skepticism as a central tenet of Platonism. This skeptical period of ancient Platonism, from Arcesilaus to Philo of Larissa, became known as the New Academy, although some ancient authors added further subdivisions, such as a Middle Academy. The Academic skeptics do not seem to have doubted the existence of truth in itself, only the capacities for obtaining it. They differed from the principles of the Pyrrhonists in the practical tendency of their doctrines: while the object of the Pyrrhonists was the attainment of perfect equanimity, it seems that the Academics were less overborne than the Pyrrhonists by the practical issue of their doubts. The attitude maintained by the Academics contained a negative criticism of the views of others, in particular of the dogmatism of the Stoics. But they acknowledged some vestiges of a moral law within, at best but a probable guide, the possession of which, however, formed the real distinction between the sage and the fool. Slight as the difference may appear between the speculative statements of the Academic skeptics and the Pyrrhonists, a comparison of their lives leads to the conclusion that a practical moderation was the characteristic of the Academic skeptics.

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