Vacco v. Quill
| Vacco v. Quill | |
|---|---|
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| Argued January 8, 1997 Decided June 26, 1997 |
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| Full case name | Vacco, Attorney General of New York, et al. v. Quill et al. |
| Citations | 521 U.S. 793 (more) |
| Prior history | On writ of cert. to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit |
| Holding | |
| States have a legitimate interest in outlawing assisted suicide; "liberty" defined in the 14th Amendment does not include the right to kill oneself, or assistance in doing so. | |
| Court membership | |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas |
| Concurrence | O'Connor, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Concurrence | Stevens |
| Concurrence | Souter |
| Concurrence | Ginsburg |
| Concurrence | Breyer |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. XIV | |
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the right to die. It ruled 9-0 that a New York ban on physician-assisted suicide was constitutional, and preventing doctors from assisting their patients, even those terminally ill and/or in great pain, was a legitimate state interest that was well within the authority of the state to regulate. In brief, this decision established that, as a matter of law, there was no constitutional guarantee of a "right to die."
The State of New York had enacted a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide, making it a crime for a physician to administer lethal medication or to otherwise knowingly and intentionally end the life of a patient, even a consenting, mentally competent, and terminally ill patient.
A number of physicians (here the respondents) filed suit against New York's Attorney General, in United States District Court, challenging the law on constitutional grounds. The respondents argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that a patient, while still enjoying the right to refuse treatment when terminally ill, did not enjoy the right to authorize a doctor to end their life. In effect, the respondents argued that refusing treatment and requesting that their doctor assist them in ending their life were "the same thing."
The District Court ruled in favor of the New York statute. In its decision, the court stated that the State of New York had a rational, legitimate interest in preserving life and protecting vulnerable persons; as such, the law was not unconstitutional. The District Court said that this was a matter of legislation, and, if the ban were to be repealed, it would take an act of New York's legislature (or a binding referendum by the voters) to do so.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment. The Appeals Court reasoned that, even though the law itself applied as a general rule to all persons, a fact that the District Court noted in determining its constitutionality, it did not treat all competent patients equally when they were near death and wished to end their lives. To this effect, the Appeals Court said that, for example, a patient attached to a life support device was allowed to require its removal, while a person under identical circumstances could not demand that a doctor administer drugs to ensure the patient's death. It agreed with the contention that removing life support devices was identical to requesting physician-assisted euthanasia, and thereby reversed the lower court's finding.
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