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Force-initiation


The non-aggression principle is a rhetorical concept espoused by right-libertarianism that forbids actions that are inconsistent with a right-libertarian conception of property rights and other rights. The principle defines "aggression" and "initiation of force" as violation of these rights.

"Aggression", for the purposes of NAP, is defined as initiating or threatening the violation of the property rights an individual would hypothetically be entitled to in a right-libertarian society. In contrast to pacifism, the non-aggression principle does not preclude reasonable self-defence. The NAP is considered to be a defining principle of natural-rights libertarianism.

Because the principle redefines aggression in right-libertarian terms, use of the NAP as a justification for right-libertarianism has been criticized as circular reasoning and as rhetorical obfuscation of the coercive and aggressive nature of libertarian property law enforcement.

The non-aggression principle was first formally described by this name by the Objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand, and then further popularized by libertarian thinkers.

A number of authors have created their own formulation of the non-aggression principle, as shown in the table below.

The principle has been derived by various philosophical approaches, including:

The non-aggression principle defines aggression in right-libertarian terms. Non-libertarian critics have observed that this actually means support for violent aggression as conventionally defined: enforcement of right-libertarian property law requires violent aggression to enforce as much as any other law. This additionally means non-aggression as a justification for right-libertarianism is circular reasoning: one cannot determine which party is the aggressor unless one has already accepted a prior theory of rules, libertarian or otherwise. Ayn Rand herself rejected the NAP as an axiom and regarded it as consequence of more underlying philosophy.

Many supporters and opponents of abortion rights justify their position on NAP grounds. One important question to determine whether or not abortion is consistent with NAP is at what stage of development a fertilized human egg cell can be considered a human being with the status and rights attributed to personhood. Some supporters of NAP argue this occurs at the moment of conception. Others argue that since they believe the fetus lacks sentience until a certain stage of development, it does not qualify as a human being, and as such may be considered property of the mother. Opponents of abortion, on the other hand, state sentience is not a qualifying factor. They refer to the animal rights discussion and point out the Argument from marginal cases that concludes NAP also applies to non-sentient (i.e. mentally handicapped) humans.


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